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ASSAULT ON THE COMMON LAW OF PREMISES LIA-
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OCCUPIER OF LAND OWE TO A POLICE OFFICER WHO
ENTERS THE PREMISES OF ANOTHER BY AUTHORITY
OF LAW? Newton v. New Hanover County Board of
Education
I. INTRODUCTION
Someone or something sets off a silent alarm in a deserted
office or home. The trigger may be an unwelcome intruder or a
rodent scurrying across the floor. Whatever the cause, the local
law enforcement agency promptly dispatches a police officer to
investigate. When the officer arrives on the scene, he intervenes
on behalf of the landowner if there is a burglar on the premises or
ensures the security of the premises if the prowler was merely a
mouse. Citizens depend on the police to faithfully perform the
duties necessary to protect them and to defend their property
against unlawful damage, destruction, or misappropriation. What
duty of care should police officers expect from a landowner when
they enter the landowner's property by authority of law?
Under the common law of North Carolina, the nature and
extent of the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land to persons
injured on his land depends upon whether the injured person is
classified as an "invitee," a "licensee," or a "trespasser."' An invi-
tee is a person who enters by express or implied invitation of the
landowner for the mutual benefit of the landowner and the invi-
tee.2 A licensee is a person who enters with permission, express or
implied, but solely for his own purposes. 3 A trespasser is a person
who enters the land of another without permission or other right.4
Some jurisdictions have abandoned any distinctions based upon
the status of an entrant.5 Because some entrants do not fit well
1. Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 342 N.C. 554, 559, 467
S.E.2d 58, 63 (1996).
2. Mazzacco v. Purcell, 303 N.C. 493, 497, 279 S.E.2d 583, 587 (1981).
3. Id. at 497, 279 S.E.2d at 586-87; Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C.
534, 540, 107 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1959).
4. Hood, 249 N.C. at 540, 107 S.E.2d at 158.
5. Newton, 342 N.C. at 561, 467 S.E.2d at 64 (citing Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo.
1971)).
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into these traditional classifications, some jurisdictions classify
such entrants injured on the land of another in a unique class, as
sui generis.e Other jurisdictions apply the "firefighter's rule" to
police officers who enter another's land in the discharge of public
duties. The rule effectively bars recovery from negligent
landowners.7
Under the traditional rules for premises liability, there is "an
ascending degree of duty owed" by a landowner to persons on the
land based on their status of entry, i.e., trespasser, licensee, or
invitee.8 A landowner is under a duty to an invitee to use ordi-
nary care to keep his property reasonably safe and to warn of hid-
den perils or unsafe conditions that could be discovered by
reasonable inspection.9 A property owner is liable "for injuries
sustained by an invitee which are caused by dangerous conditions
known, or which should have been known, by the property owner
but which are unknown and not to be anticipated by the invitee."1°
The duty owed to a licensee is similar to the duty owed to a tres-
passer, but because the owner has the duty of anticipating the
presence of a licensee, the duty owed to a licensee is greater." If a
licensee, exercising due care for his own safety, is upon the prop-
erty of another and the land owner is "affirmatively and actively
negligent in the management of his property or business, as a
result of which the licensee is subjected to increased danger, the
owner will be liable for injuries sustained as a result of such active
and affirmative negligence."' 2 The duty owed to a trespasser is
that a trespasser must not be willfully or wantonly injured.'"
6. Newton, 342 N.C. at 561, 467 S.E.2d at 64 (citing Shypulski v. Waldorf
Paper Prod. Co., 45 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. 1951); Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129
(N.J. 1960); Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 127 N.E. 491 (N.Y. 1920)).
7. Newton, 342 N.C. at 561, 467 S.E.2d at 63-64 (citing Flowers v. Rock
Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 520 A.2d 361 (Md. 1987)).
8. Id. at 63.
9. Id. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64 (quoting Newton, 114 N.C. App. 724, 443
S.E.2d at 350, in turn citing Roumillat v. Simplistic Enters. Inc. 331 N.C. 57, 414
S.E.2d 339 (1992)).
10. Id. at 560, 467 S.E.2d at 63 (quoting Williams v. McSwain, 248 N.C. 13,
102 S.E. 2d 464 (1958), in turn quoting Harris v. [Nachamson] Dep't Stores Co.,
247 N.C. 195, 198-99, 100 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1957)).
11. Id. (quoting Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 107 S.E. 2d 154
(1954), in turn quoting Wagoner v. Railroad, 238 N.C. 162, 172, 77 S.E.2d 701,
709 (1953)).
12. Id.
13. Jessup v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 244 N.C. 242, 245,
93 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1956).
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In cases of premises liability, North Carolina has generally
followed the common law doctrine that the nature and extent of
the duty owed by the owner or occupier of land to persons injured
on the land depends upon the classification of the injured per-
son.14 What duty of care does a landowner owe to a police officer
who is injured when he responds to a call on the landowner's prop-
erty? Does it depend on whether his status on the land is invitee,
licensee, or trespasser? Do the circumstances surrounding the
injury matter? Is the reason for the police officer's presence on the
property relevant?
In Newton v. New Hanover County Board of Education, a
police officer sued the school district for injuries he sustained
while responding to a silent alarm on school property.15 The
North Carolina Supreme Court determined as a matter of first
impression that the duty of care owed by an owner or occupier of
land to a police officer on the landowner's premises in the perform-
ance of his public duty is the same as the duty owed to invitee.'6
It appears that in order to avoid liability to police officers coming
onto the premises. A landowner must use ordinary care to keep
his property reasonably safe and must also warn of hidden perils
or unsafe conditions that could be ascertained by the landowner
by reasonable inspection.17 In order for a police officer to recover
for his injuries, he "must show that the property owner either neg-
ligently created the condition that caused the injury or that the
owner failed to correct the condition after receiving actual or con-
structive notice of its existence."'I Newton clearly sets forth the
duty of care owed by North Carolina landowners to police officers
who enter the land under authority of law. However, the decision
leaves some questions concerning application of the law
unanswered.
This Note examines the liability of landowners to police
officers who enter upon the land in the execution of their public
duties and are injured as a consequence of a coincident hazardous
condition on the land. Section II presents the relevant facts of
Newton v. New Hanover County Board of Education'9 and the con-
clusions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals and Supreme
14. Newton, 342 N.C. at 559, 467 S.E.2d at 63.
15. Id. at 556, 467 S.E.2d at 61.
16. Id. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64.
17. Id. (quoting Newton, 114 N.C. App. at 724, 443 S.E.2d at 351).
18. Id.
19. 342 N.C. 554, 467 S.E.2d 58.
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Court. Section III reviews the traditional common law in the
United States related to the duty of care owed by landowners to
invitees, licensees, and to a limited extent, trespassers. It also
examines the modern trend that eliminates or modifies the com-
mon law rules related to premises liability and bases liability on a
standard of reasonable care. Included among the modern treat-
ments are "entrants upon the land by right," a class sui generis,
the "firefighter's rule" and its application to police officers injured,
and the unique duty of care owed to police officers who enter the
land of another under authority of law. Section III concludes with
a discussion of the reasons for retaining the common law classifi-
cation system and reasons to abandon or modify it. Section IV dis-
cusses the possible ramifications of this decision on premises
liability for North Carolina landowners when police officers are
injured while acting under authority of law. A concern is raised
about a landowner's duty to warn a police officer of hidden perils
and unsafe conditions when the officer enters when the landowner
is unaware of the officer's presence. Section V concludes with a
suggestion that the duty to warn should exist only when the land-
owner has had a reasonable opportunity to warn the officer of hid-
den perils and unsafe conditions. It also suggests the possibility
that North Carolina may have taken a first step in joining the
trend away from the traditional system of "invitee, licensee, and
trespasser" classifications and toward landowner premises liabil-
ity based on the standard of reasonable care and foreseeability.
II. THE CASE
A. Facts of the Case - At the Trial Court
On June 6, 1989, plaintiff Stewart B. Newton, a uniformed
patrol officer, was dispatched by the Wilmington City Police to the
New Hanover High School field house in response to a silent
alarm.20 After arriving at the school, Officer Newton climbed an
outside stairway to the second floor of the field house and found
the door secure.21 As he descended the steps, he had difficulty
maneuvering the stairway and he fell down the steps injuring his
hand, wrist, and arm severely enough to require medical care and
be out of work for a period of time.22 Consequently, Officer
20. Id. at 556, 467 S.E.2d at 61.
21. Id. at 557, 467 S.E.2d at 61.
22. Id. at 557-58, 467 S.E.2d at 61-62. Plaintiff suffered a fifty-five percent
permanent physical impairment of his left little finger. Plaintiff incurred
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Newton brought suit against the New Hanover County Board of
Education.
On March 5, 1990, the jury in New Hanover County Superior
Court returned a verdict for plaintiff, Officer Newton, and
awarded damages in the amount of $20,000.23 In his charge to the
jury, the trial judge instructed the jury that Officer Newton was
an invitee on the premises of New Hanover County Schools at the
time of the injury, and the defendant therefore "owed plaintiff a
duty to exercise reasonable care to keep its premises in a reason-
ably safe condition."24 Defendant then moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and the trial court granted this
motion, holding that "the evidence showed as a matter of law that
[Plaintiff] was a licensee rather than an invitee at the time of the
injury, and that no evidence was presented to show that defend-
ant violated the duty owed to a licensee.25
B. In The Court of Appeals
Officer Newton appealed the trial court's decision, arguing
that the trial court erred in holding that he was a licensee at the
time of his injury.26 The defendant argued that "plaintiff should
be considered a licensee because public policy considerations pro-
hibit a police officer from recovering from a property owner when
medical expenses in the amount of $1,233.41 and lost wages in the amount of
$1,856.57. He also received workers' compensation benefits from his employer in
the amount of $5,086.67.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 558, 467 S.E.2d at 63.
25. Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 114 N.C. App. 719, 722, 443
S.E.2d 347, 349 (1994), affd, 342 N.C. 554, 467 S.E.2d 58 (1996).
26. Id. The trial court made a number of findings:
The Undersigned [judge] hereby finds that evidence presented in this
case discloses as a matter of law that the plaintiff was a licensee as
opposed to an invitee at the time of the injury on the defendant's
premises.
The Undersigned also finds that there was no evidence presented that
defendant violated the duty owed to a licensee;
The Court also finds that if the plaintiff were an invitee on the premises
of the defendant at the time of the injury, the Court finds as a matter of
law that there was insufficient evidence of negligence on part of the
defendant for the issue to be submitted to the jury;
The Court also holds that the evidence presented in this case
demonstrates as a matter of law that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent.
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the officer entered the premises in the course of performing his
duty and was injured by the condition which required his pres-
ence. "27 The Court of Appeals noted, however, that Plaintiff was
injured from a condition of the premises which was inherently
dangerous (the stairway) and "not as a result of a risk incident to
the performance of his duties as a police officer." 28 Because Plain-
tiff entered the school system property at the defendant's "implied
invitation to perform a service which was of benefit to defend-
ant"29 (answering a silent alarm on property owned by the school
system), the Court of Appeals concluded that Plaintiff was an invi-
tee. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with one judge
dissenting. °
In his dissenting opinion Judge Johnson stated that a police
officer who enters property in response to a silent alarm fits
neither the definition of an invitee nor a licensee.3 1 Judge John-
son continued his reasoning by stating that the police officer is not
a licensee, "one who enters on the premises with the possessor's
permission, express or implied, solely for his own purposes rather
than the possessor's benefit,"32 because he did not enter the prem-
ises solely for his own purposes. 3 Also, Plaintiff did not intend to
benefit himself by going onto the school's premises and so is not an
invitee, "a person who goes upon the premises in response to an
express or implied invitation by the landowner for the mutual
benefit of the landowner and himself."3 4 Judge Johnson believed
the police officer intended to benefit both the landowner and the
public; 35 he stated:
[T]he predominant "nature of the business bringing [the police
officer] to the premises" herein is the officer's duty, as a law
enforcement officer, to carry out the responsibilities of his job. A
police officer is one who enters the premises of a property owner
under the authority of law. On the facts herein, the police officer is
27. Id. at 724, 443 S.E.2d at 350. See infra text accompanying notes 101-14
for a discussion of the "firefighter's rule."
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 725, 443 S.E.2d at 350-51.
31. Id. at 725, 443 S.E.2d at 351.
32. Id. at 726, 443 S.E.2d at 351.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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entering the school property for the benefit of the public, to main-
tain civil order and to promote the public welfare."6
Judge Johnson concluded Plaintiffs status more closely resembled
that of a licensee. 3
7
C. In the Supreme Court
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Court of
Appeals properly reversed the trial court's entry of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and thus affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision.3 The Court held, as a matter of first impres-
sion, that the duty owed to a police officer when he enters a land-
owner's premises in the performance of his public duty is the same
as the duty owed to an invitee.39 In conducting his public duties, a
police officer enters land by authority of law and his invitation to
enter the premises of a landowner should be implied in law.4 °
Therefore, a property owner owes a police officer the duty to use
ordinary care to keep his property reasonably safe and to warn of
hidden perils or unsafe conditions that could be ascertained by
reasonable inspection.41 In order to recover for injuries suffered
on the premises, a police officer must show either that the land
owner "negligently created the condition that caused the injury or
that the owner failed to correct the condition after receiving actual
or constructive notice of its existence."42
III. THE BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Common Law Status Rule
Most jurisdictions follow the traditional common law
approach to premises liability.43 When a person comes upon the
premises of a landowner or occupier of land and is injured because
of the condition of the premises, the scope of the landowner's lia-
bility depends on the status of the entrant at the time of the acci-
dent.4 4 Traditionally, entrants are classified as invitees,
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Newton, 342 N.C. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64.
39. Id. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Newton, 114 N.C. App. at 724, 443 S.E.2d at 350 (citing Roumillat v.
Simplistic Enters., Inc., 331 N.C. 57, 414 S.E.2d 339 (1992)).
43. 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 72 (1990).
44. Id.
7
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licensees, or trespassers, and the duty owed to the entrant by the
landowner varies according to the classification.45
1. Duty of Care Owed to 'Invitees"
Invitees enter the land by invitation, either express or
implied, of the landowner for their mutual advantage.46 An invi-
tee is known as a "business visitor" if he is "invited to enter or
remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with
business dealings with the possessor of the land."17 A "public invi-
tee" is a "person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open
to the public."' 8 The courts extend "public invitee" status to visi-
tors who may enter to attend free public lectures, church services,
places of amusement such as parks, playgrounds, swimming
pools, libraries, wharves, golf courses, community centers, and
state and federal land.49
"Invitee" is a word of legal art.5 The meaning of the word
"invitation" in the context of premises liability is misleading
because the meaning in this context is not the same as the com-
mon meaning.51 For example, a social guest who is invited to a
host's home or business in response to an "invitation" is not an
invitee in most jurisdictions, but rather a licensee.52 In order to
be an invitee in some jurisdictions, it is necessary for the person
entering the premises to be there for the mutual advantage of both
parties.53 If the invitation is for the convenience, pleasure, or ben-
efit of the person entering the land, he is only a licensee.5 '
Although a person may enter as a social guest, his status some-
45. Id.
46. Id. at § 87.
47. Id. at § 88.
48. Id.
49. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 61, at 422-23
(5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). See generally Keeton for an extensive listing of
cases in which visitors were classified as invitees. See also STRONG's N.C. INDEX,
Negligence § 51 (4th ed. 1993).
50. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 87 (1990).
51. Id.
52. Id. at § 89.
53. Id. An example is when a patron enters a store to purchase an item for
sale by the owner.
54. Id.
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times changes from licensee to invitee by certain transactions
between the parties after entrance onto the premises.55
One test the courts use to determine whether to classify an
entrant as an invitee is the "economic benefit" test.56 Courts
classify an entrant as an invitee when the landowner has an
actual financial or economic interest in the visit.57 Courts also use
the "mutual interest" test instead of, or in conjunction with, the
economic benefit test.5 8 This test requires the visitor to enter for a
purpose connected with the business of the landowner, or there
must be at least "some mutuality of interest in the subject, to
which the visitor's business relates."59 Such a business relation-
ship is not required to be a commercial enterprise.6 0 For example,
if the landowner asks the entrant to perform some needed service,
even if it is gratuitous, some jurisdictions accord the entrant sta-
tus as an invitee.6 1
A landowner is under an affirmative duty to an invitee to pro-
tect him not only against dangers of which the landowner knows,
but also against those dangers he should have discovered if he
exercised reasonable care. 62 This duty of care extends only to
"area[s] of invitation,"63 including "the entrance to the property
and to a safe exit after the invitee's purpose is concluded. The
duty also extends to all parts of the premises to which the invitee's
purpose may reasonably be expected to take him."64
55. Id.
56. Id. at § 90.
57. Id.
58. Id. at § 91. The "mutual interest test" is also known as the "mutual
advantage test."
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. This may occur when a friend or relative is invited for dinner and then
remains to help repair a leaky faucet.
62. One who enters or goes upon the premises of another as a business
visitor, at the express or implied invitation of the owner (or occupant),or
in connection with the business of the owner (or occupant), is called in
law an invitee. The invitation to enter extends not only to those parts of
the premises which the invitee or business visitor may be expressly
invited to use, but also to such parts as he is invited to enter by fair
implication. That'is to say, the invitation extends to all parts of the
premises where the invitee, under the circumstances and condition of
his invitation, should reasonably be expected to go.
EDWARD J. DEvrIr, ET AL. FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, Part V.
§ 80.11, Duty of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Invitee (1987).
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 424.
64. Id. See also DEvrir ET AL., supra note 62.
9
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2. Duty of Care Owed to "Licensees"
The second category of entrant upon the land is licensee. A
licensee "enters the property of another for his own convenience,
pleasure, or benefit, only for purposes of his own and not in
response to an implied invitation to the public generally to make
use of the premises."65 The Restatement describes a licensee as "a
person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue
of the possessor's consent."
66
There are a number of types of licensees. When a landowner
gives a person permission to enter by words that express a mani-
fest consent for the licensee to enter, the entrant is an "express
licensee."67 This consent may be given either in writing or
orally.68 If the landowner speaks or acts in such a way that
"give[s] the entrant reason to believe that he consents to the entry
upon his land,"6 9 the entrant is an implied licensee because con-
sent to enter can be implied from the landowners words or actions.
This is true even if the owner did not intend to consent to the
entrance.7 ° When a landowner habitually acquiesces in the use of
his property by the public, his tolerance may transform trespass-
ers into licensees. 71 A "licensee by invitation" or "social guest" is a
person who has been invited by "some affirmative act which would
justify a reasonable person in believing that the owner has given
his consent to the entry of the particular person."72 When a social
guest gratuitously performs household tasks of obvious benefit to
his host, his status as a licensee does not change to invitee in most
jurisdictions. 73 One who enters by mere sufferance or acquies-
cence is a "bare," " naked," or "mere" licensee. 4
The liability of a landowner to a licensee is limited in scope. A
landowner is under no obligation to the licensee to inspect his land
for unknown dangers or to disclose their existence or to take pre-
65. 62 AM. Jun. 2D Premises Liability § 108 (1990).
66. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965)).
67. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 109 (1990).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. An implied license was granted when the public was allowed to use a
shortcut across a parking lot. Id. at n.46.
72. Id. at § 110.
73. Id. See also KEETON ET AT. supra note 49, § 61, at 414.
74. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 110 (1990). KEETON, supra note 49,
§ 61, at 412.
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cautions against them.75 While the licensee must accept the
premises as the landowner uses them, he is entitled to know of the
dangers the landowner has discovered. 76 A landowner will be held
to the reasonable person standard in realizing the significance of
dangers he uncovers.77 If the danger is obvious, the licensee must
look out for himself and there is no obligation on the part of the
landowner to warn of these obvious dangers. 78
3. Duty of Care Owed to "Trespassers"
The third category for entrants upon the land is "tres-
passer."7 9 A trespasser is any person who enters the land of
another without permission, privilege, or other right.80 In North
Carolina, the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land to a tres-
passer is to avoid actions that may willfully or wantonly injure the
entrant.8
1
B. Modern Trend Toward Abolition of Traditional Categories
In 1957, England abolished the distinction between invitees
and licensees by statute and imposed a common duty of care
toward all lawful entrants.8 2 In 1958, the Supreme Court of the
United States followed England's lead and declined to apply the
traditional entrant classification distinction to the law of admi-
ralty.8 3 In 1968, the Supreme Court of California abolished the
traditional classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser in a
landmark decision and declared the ordinary negligence princi-
ples of foreseeable risk and ,reasonable care to be the standard for
premises liability in California.84 Between 1969 and 1985, eleven
jurisdictions followed California's lead and abolished all distinc-
75. KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 412, 416.
76. Id. at 416-417.
77. Id. at 418.
78. Id. at 416-417.
79. Because a police officer who enters the land of another under authority of
law is generally not a trespasser, the discussion of trespassers is limited in this
Note.
80. Hood, 249 N.C. at 540, 107 S.E.2d at 158.
81. Jessup, 244 N.C. at 245, 93 S.E.2d at 87.
82. KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 62, at 432-33.
83. Id. at 433 (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358
U.S. 625 (1959)).
84. Id. (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
11
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tions among entrants on land. 5 In the last decade only Nevada
has abolished all entrant classifications.8 6
Eleven states abolished the distinction between invitees and
licensees but retained limited duties to trespassers.8 7 Six other
states have modified the common law categories without abolish-
ing them outright. Missouri and Kentucky require a duty of care
to all entrants equal to the duty of care owed to invitees once the
landowner is aware of the presence of the entrant.88 Connecticut
and Illinois passed legislation modifying the common law status of
a social guest from licensee to invitee.8 9 Indiana and Maine judi-
cially altered the status of social guest from licensee to invitee.90
C. Persons on the Land as a Matter of Right - Sui Generis
Some entrants to land such as public officers and employees
who enter another's property for either a public or private purpose
85. Heins v. Webster County Neb., 552 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Neb. 1996) (listing and
citing Hawaii, (Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969)); Colorado
(Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo.1971) (superseded by
statute)); District of Columbia (Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97,
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973)); Rhode Island (Mariorenzi v.
Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1975) (but see Tantimonico v. Allendale
Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 1994) (restoring status category of trespasser));
New York (Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y.1976)); New Hampshire
(Ouelette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976); Louisiana (Cates v.
Beauregard Elec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 833
(1976)); Alaska (Webb v. City of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977)); Missouri
(Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976)); Illinois (Cope v. Doe, 464 N.E.2d
1023 (Ill. 1984) (only with regard to child entrants); Montana (Limberhand v. Big
Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985)).
86. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 54 (citing Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d
935 (Nev. 1994)).
87. Id. (listing and citing Minnesota (Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639
(Minn. 1972)); Massachusetts (Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973)
(see also Schofield v. Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1982) (trespasser exclusion
reaffirmed by vote of 4 to 3)); Wisconsin (Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d
1 (Wis. 1975)); North Dakota (O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977));
Maine (Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979)); Oregon (Ragnone v.
Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 633 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1981)); Tennessee (Hudson v.
Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984)); Wyoming (Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d
293 (Wyo. 1993)); Kansas (Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1994)); New
Mexico (Ford v. Bd. of County Comm'r, 879 P.2d 766 (N.M. 1994)).
See also Nebraska (Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 52).
88. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 54-55. This treatment is similar to the "discovered
trespasser" rule. Id.
89. Id. at 55.
90. Id.
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often do not fit neatly within the common law categories of invitee,
licensee, or trespasser 9' and are therefore treated as a special
class, sui generis.92 They are not trespassers because they are
privileged to come onto the land.93 The privilege to enter is abso-
lutely independent of any permission, consent, or license of the
occupier. 9 4 "They normally do not come onto the land for any of
the purposes for which the premises are held open to the public"
and when they enter upon private lands they do not enter for any
benefit of the landowner. 95
Many courts, however, do not consider those who enter as a
matter of right or in the performance of a duty as a distinct class,
and classify them in one of the traditional categories.96 Firefight-
ers and police officers entering under authority of law are gener-
ally classified as licensees but some courts classify them as
invitees or find them to have a special status.97 Where a public
officer or employee enters land in the performance of his duties, he
is usually classified as an invitee if he uses the premises as any
other invitee.9" Where the public employee comes upon the land
for a purpose related to the business of the occupier such as a gar-
bage collector, a city water meter reader, a postal delivery person,
or a building inspector, courts generally treat him as an invitee
because the landowner can reasonably anticipate the arrival of
such visitors.99 Finally, if the public employee enters the land of
another when he had no lawful occasion to so enter, the courts
may classify him as a trespasser. 10 0
91. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 412 (1990). See also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 49 § 61, at 428-429.
92. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 425 (1990).
93. KErON r AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 429.
94. Id. For example, fire fighters and police officers have the right to enter
premises independent of any permission of the possessor of the property. In fact,
the landowner has no right to exclude them. Id.
95. Id.
96. 62 AM. Jun. 2D Premises Liability § 73 (1990).
97. Id. at § 412; KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 429.
98. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 412 (1990).
99. Id. § 414; KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 429.
100. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 412 (1990).
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D. The Firefighter's Rule and Its Application to Police Officers
1. The "Firefighter's Rule"
The original fireman's rule' 01 applied only to firefighters and
precluded recovery from the landowner for injuries sustained by a
firefighter who was injured while fighting a fire caused by the neg-
ligence of the landowner.10 2 This rule applies to prevent recovery
by a firefighter not only for injuries caused directly by the fire, but
also for injuries which result from the original hazard which
caused the firefighter's presence on the premises.10 3  The
firefighter's rule is sometimes applied to police officers and pre-
cludes recovery by them when they are injured as a result of fore-
seeable risk as a part of their duties as police officers.' 0 4 Recovery
against the landowner on grounds that the landowner negligently
created the situation requiring the assistance of the police officer
is also precluded. 105 The rule applies to any injury to a police
officer which may result whether the injury occurred on private or
public property.10 6
2. Examples of the Application of the "Firefighter's Rule" to
Police Officers
Some examples of the application of the firefighter's rule to
police officers may be helpful in understanding the scope of the
rule. The first example is a case in which a police officer was dis-
patched to a tavern and was injured while attempting to break up
a fight in the tavern. 10 7 Recovery was barred because the police
officer incurred the injury as a direct result of the purpose for
which he entered the tavern. In the second example, a police
officer who was injured when he stepped in a hole in the land-
owner's yard while responding to a burglar alarm on the premises
was allowed to recover.' 08 The injury resulted from an act of neg-
101. The "fireman's rule" is also known as the "firefighter's rule."
102. 62 Am. Jur. 2D Premises Liability § 432 (1990). See also David L. Strauss,
Comment, Where There's Smoke, There's the Firefighter's Rule: Containing the
Conflagration After One Hundred Years, Wis. L. REV. 2031 (1992); Benjamin K
Riley, Comment, The Fireman's Rule: Defining Its Scope Using the Cost-
Spreading Rationale, 71 CAL. L. REV. 218 (1983).
103. 62 AM. JuRA. 2D Premises Liability § 432 (1990).
104. Id. at § 434.
105. Id.
106. Id. at § 431.
107. Id. at § 434.
108. Id. at § 435 n.83.
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ligence by the landowner independent of the activation of the
alarm, the cause of the police officer's presence at the scene. 10 9
The third example is less clear cut. A police officer slipped on a
snowy ramp in a bus parking lot while walking to confront a pro-
tester throwing snowballs at the buses.110 Here, the court found
the firefighter's rule barred recovery because the risk of slipping
was a particular risk of employment that the officer was compen-
sated to confront."1
3. Exceptions to the Application of the "Firefighter's Rule"
There are several common exceptions to the application of the
firefighter rule. Courts have carved out these exceptions because
of the perceived unfairness of the rule in certain circumstances.
In instances of willful or wanton conduct by a property owner that
results in the injury of a public rescuer, recovery has been
allowed. 112 Courts also allow recovery for injuries suffered when
landowners know of hidden dangers on their property, have the
opportunity to warn the public rescuer of the danger, and fail to so
warn. 113 Many courts also allow recovery when the landowner
violates a statute or ordinance requiring safety guards, precau-
tions, or other maintenance and failure to perform these lawfully
imposed safety measures results in injury to a public rescuer.11 4
E. Landowner Liability for Injuries to Police Officers in the
United States
The duty of care owed by landowners to police officers injured
because of a dangerous land condition varies among jurisdictions.
Police officers are treated as invitees, licensees, and sui generis
depending both upon the jurisdiction and the particular facts of
the case.
1. Police Officer as "Invitee"
Some courts consider police officers to be invitees only under
certain circumstances. These circumstances include when they
109. Id.
110. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 434 (1990 & Supp. 1996).
111. Id.
112. 62 Am. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 437 (1990); KEETON ET AL., supra note
49, § 61, at 430.
113. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 423 (1990).
114. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 438 (1990). See also KENNETH C.
PAYUMO, Cops Assuming the Position (of Risk), 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46 (1996).
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come upon the premises as part of their regular patrol or at the
specific invitation of the owner, or only when they are upon those
parts of the premises open to the public generally. 115 Courts do
not always find that a police officer who comes upon the premises
in response to an alarm is an invitee. 1 16 Other courts require the
duty of care owed by a landowner to all police officers who enter
the premises in performance of their public duties to be the duty
owed to an invitee. These courts impose liability on the land-
owner for injury to a police officer if the landowner:
(1) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to such invitee, and
(2) should expect that the invitee will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect himself against it, and
(3) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against
the danger. 1 17
2. Police Officer as "Licensee"
In jurisdictions observing the traditional common law catego-
ries for entrants upon the land, the majority of courts hold that a
police officer who enters upon premises in the discharge of his
public duty has the status of a licensee. 1 18 Under these circum-
stances, the landowner must exercise reasonable care for the
police officer's protection" 9 and must also refrain from injuring
him intentionally or by willful and wanton conduct. 120 As with
other licensees, there is no general obligation to inspect and pre-
pare the premises, but there is a duty to give warning of hidden
dangers of which the landowner knows. 21
3. Police Officer as "Sui Generis"
Some jurisdictions reject the classification of a police officer as
an invitee or licensee. 122 These jurisdictions treat police officers as
sui generis, a special class privileged to enter the land for public
115. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 423 (1990).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at § 422.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at § 425.
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purposes. 2 ' In these jurisdictions, for purposes of determining
the duty owed by landowners of private premises to police officers
who enter the premises in performance of their duties without any
express or implied request, invitation, or permission of the owners
or occupiers, the police officers are either to be considered as sui
generis or as having a special status as persons rightfully on the
premises. 124 Police officers do not fit within any of the common
law categories of trespasser, licensee, or invitee, and their .legal
status according to these common law categories is not determina-
tive of the duties and liabilities of landowners. 125
F. The Basis for Selection of Premises Liability Standards
1. Reasons for Retaining Traditional Common Law Entrant
Classifications
The majority of jurisdictions continue to follow the common
law rules for premises liability.126 Since 1985, only one jurisdic-
tion has abolished the common law classification of invitee, licen-
see, and trespasser and six other jurisdictions have altered the
classification scheme in some way. 127 Of the thirty-seven jurisdic-
tions reconsidering the common law classification scheme, twenty-
three have abolished either some or all of the common law catego-
ries. 128 However, fourteen states expressly retained the common
law entrant categories, 29 and another fourteen jurisdictions con-
tinued to apply the common law doctrine without specifically
addressing its continuing validity.'30
There are a number of reasons purported for the retention of
the common law classification scheme of "invitee," "licensee," and
"trespasser."' 3 ' Supporters believe that a "unitary standard
would not lessen the confusion inherent in the common law
scheme but would instead produce inconsistent and unpredictable
rules of law."13 2 These proponents of the traditional common law
123. Id.
124. Id. For a discussion of persons rightfully on the premises, see supra text
accompanying notes 91-100.
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 72. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
127. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 55.
128. Id.
129. KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 62 n.7 (Supp. 1988).
130. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 55.
131. Id.
132. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 78 (1990).
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scheme are more comfortable with a stable and established sys-
tem of loss allocation than with the establishment of a system
devoid of standards for liability. 13 3 Some courts fear a radical
change will shift "social policy decisions to the jury with minimal
guidance from the courts."' 34 Other supporters believe there is
sufficient flexibility in the common law approach brought about by
judicial grafting of exceptions and subclassifications to fulfill the
needs of modern society.13 5
2. The Argument for Abolishing the Traditional Common
Law Entrant Classifications
The common law treatment of the duty of care owed by own-
ers and occupiers of land to entrants upon the land based on the
classification of the entrant as invitee, licensee, and trespasser
has been criticized by a host of commentators1 3 6 because it is
"harshly mechanical, unduly complex, and overly protective of
property interests at the expense of human safety."13 7 Critics of
the traditional classification of entrants upon the land present a
number of reasons to support abandonment of the common law
scheme. One reason is the "lack of a relationship between the
common law categories and the exercise of reasonable care."138 A
second reason is the change in society from a chiefly rural one to
133. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 55.
134. 62 Am. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 78 (1990).
135. Id.
136. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 62, at 432. See also Steve Cole,
Comment, Tort Law: Premises Liability: Kansas "Bridges" the Gap between
Licensee and Invitee [Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1994)], 34 WASHBURN
L.J. 100 (1994).
137. KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 62, at 432.
138. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 80. See also Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 55
(quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1968)):
A man'solife or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law
nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has
come upon the land of another without permission or with permission
but without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily
vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus upon the
status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to
determine the question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is
contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values. The
common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper
considerations which should govern determination of the question of
duty.
[Vol. 19:579596
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an urban industrial society.'39 Another justification for aban-
doning the harsh common law rules is elimination of the complex-
ity and unpredictable results which sometimes result from the
application of harsh common law rules.140 Critics of the common
law scheme contend that sometimes contemporary community
standards and the complexity of the rules present conflicts and
confusion for juries resulting in verdicts incompatible with the
common law. 14 ' Jurisdictions that urge the abandonment of
premises liability based upon the distinctions of the status of the
entrant suggest the substitution of a standard based upon reason-
able care and the foreseeability of the injury under ordinary negli-
gence principles. 142
3. The Rationale for the "Firefighter's Rule"
Three rationales have been offered as the foundation for the
firefighter's rule. 4 ' The first rationale for the firefighter's rule is
the principle of assumption of the risk. 44 The second rationale is
based upon the officer's assumption of duties or the foreseeable
139. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 55-56, quoting Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51
(Mass. 1973), where the court found:
It no longer makes any sense to predicate the landowner's duty solely on
the status of the injured party as either a licensee or invitee. Perhaps in
a rural society with sparse land settlements and large estates, it would
have been unduly burdensome to obligate the owner to inspect and
maintain distant holdings for a class of entrants who were using the
property "for their own convenience" . . . but the special immunity
which the licensee rule affords landowners cannot be justified in an
urban industrial society.
140. Heins, 552 N.W.2d at 56 (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358
U.S. at 630-31) where the Court declared:
[C]ourts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal
refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common law
categories, and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care
which the landowner owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction,
the classifications and subclassifications bred by the common law have
produced confusion and conflict. [Didistinctions which the common law
draws between licensee and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply
rooted to the land, a culture which traced many of its standards to a
heritage of feudalism.
The Supreme Court went on to describe the common law as a "semantic morass"
and declined to apply it to admiralty law. Id.
141. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 80, 84 (1990).
142. Id. at § 431.
143. Riley, supra note 102, at 218.
144. Id.
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risks of employment and the consequent compensation for risk.1 4 5
A firefighter or police officer cannot complain of negligence in the
creation of dangerous situations requiring his assistance because
they have voluntarily committed themselves to dealing with haz-
ardous circumstances. 146 Where states have abolished the doc-
trine of implied assumption of risk, the firefighter's rule is
abolished as a rule of law.' 47 The third rationale is a cost-spread-
ing rationale under which recovery is barred because of the availa-
bility of a statutory compensation scheme funded with tax dollars
which usually includes enhanced salaries, disability benefits, and
retirement benefits. 48 This rationale is based on the public policy
decision to meet the public obligation to firefighters and police
officers injured in the line of duty through tax supported compen-
sation mechanisms rather than individual tort claims.' 4
9
4. Reasons for Adoption of a Special Premises Liability Rule
for Police Officers
Commentators promote several reasons for adopting the clas-
sification scheme which makes police officers sui generis. When
police officers enter the land of another in the performance of their
public duties they act in the best interest of the public, not for
their own convenience and pleasure. 50 The landowner does not
have the freedom to approve or refuse the admission of a police
officer who enters by authority of law and could not lawfully stop
the officer if he wished to do so.' 5 ' An express or implied invita-
tion by the land owner to enter the land is an essential element of
the invitee classification.' 52 Police Officers are not trespassers
since they are privileged to enter the premises when acting within
the bounds of their official duties. 53 Because police officers often
do not fit neatly into the common law categories of invitee, licen-
see, and trespasser, some jurisdictions place them in a separate
category for purposes of determining premises liability.154
145. Id. See also 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 431 (1990); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 431.
146. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 431 (1990).
147. Id.
148. Riley, supra note 102, at 218.
149. Id. at 235-236.
150. 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability § 412 (1990).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 61, at 428-29.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Police officers acting by authority of law are treated under the
common law categories of entrants to land as invitees, licensees,
and trespassers in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Whether
they are treated as invitee or licensee depends both on the circum-
stances of the case and the jurisdiction. A few jurisdictions treat
police officers sui generis and afford them distinct treatment.
Until recently in North Carolina, the status of police officers
entering the land of another by authority of law was uncharted
territory.
A. The Reasoning of the Supreme Court Decision
Our Supreme Court joined a minority of jurisdictions recog-
nizing the status sui generis of a police officer injured while acting
in his official capacity as the result of landowner negligence in the
maintenance of the premises.155 In reaching this decision, the
Court discussed briefly the ways in which various jurisdictions
treat police officers who are injured on the land of another while
acting under authority of law. The Court accounted for jurisdic-
tions which recognize the poor fit of some entrants to land into the
traditional classifications of invitee or licensee, and the conse-
quent application in some jurisdictions of the "firefighter's
rule,"'56 classification of some entrants sui generis, and the aban-
donment in some jurisdictions of all or some of the distinctions
based upon an entrant's status as invitee, licensee, or
trespasser. 157
Defendant urged the Court to adopt the "firefighter's rule"
and apply it to the facts of this case to preclude recovery by Plain-
tiff.15 8 Justice Frye responded by stating where the "firefighter's
rule" applies, "a police officer.., who is injured in the line of duty,
'generally cannot recover damages for negligence in the very situ-
ation that creates the occasion of their services.'"159 The majority
of the Court of Appeals concluded that "plaintiff was injured not
as a result of a risk incident to the performance of his duties as a
police officer, but from a condition of the premises which plaintiffs
155. See 63 AM. Ju. 2D Premises Liability §§ 422, 423, 425 (1990).
156. Newton, 342 N.C. at 561-62, 467 S.E.2d at 63-64.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64.
159. Id. at 561, 467 S.E.2d at 64.
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evidence tended to show was inherently dangerous."16 0 Accord-
ingly, Justice Frye concluded that "the 'firefighter's rule' is inap-
plicable to the facts of Newton."161
The police officer in this case was summoned to defendant's
premises in response to a silent burglar alarm and was required to
enter the premises in the performance of his public duty.162 Jus-
tice Frye stated that this police officer "does not fit the traditional
definitions of either licensee or invitee, [but] he should be accorded
the same protection as one who is invited to the landowner's prem-
ises."163 Justice Frye continued:
The police officer entering the premises of a landowner in the per-
formance of his public duty enters by authority of law, and the
officer's invitation to enter the premises should be implied in law.
Thus, the landowner's duty toward the police officer who enters
the premises in response to an emergency call to the premises
should be no less than the duty owed to a person entering the
premises at the specific invitation of the landowner. Accordingly,
we hold that the duty owed to the police officer in the instant case
is the same as the duty owed to an invitee.16 4
B. The Scope of the Decision
1. Impact on Adoption of the "Firefighter's Rule" in North
Carolina
Although the "firefighter's rule" has been applied in many
jurisdictions to limit recovery by police officers injured in the line
of duty for more than 100 years, 16 5 this rule has not been applied
in North Carolina. The Supreme Court declined to apply the
"firefighter's rule" to the facts of this case, presumably because the
rule would not be applicable to these facts in other jurisdictions.
The question is left open as to whether the "firefighter's rule" may
be applied in North Carolina under an appropriate fact pattern
such as when a drunken bar patron shoots a police officer respond-
ing to a call from a bar owner complaining of a disturbance.
160. Id. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64 (citing Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of
Ed. 114 N.C. App. 719, 724, 443 S.E. 2d 347, 350 (1994)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Straus, supra note 102, at 2032.
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2. The Implication of Invitee Status for All Police Officers
Acting by Authority of Law
In the Newton opinion, Justice Frye specifically stated that
the "police officer entering the premises of a landowner in the per-
formance of his public duty enters by authority of law."' 6 Accord-
ing to Justice Frye, "the officer's invitation to enter the premises
should be implied in law."167 The further implication is that the
duty of care owed to a police officer who enters the land of another
by authority of law is the duty of care owed to an invitee. In North
Carolina, the duty of care owed by a landowner to an invitee is to
use ordinary care to keep his property reasonably safe and to
warn of hidden perils or unsafe conditions that could be discov-
ered by a landowner's reasonable inspection.' 68 A police officer
could thus not recover damages from a landowner if his injury is
caused by a reasonably apparent risk, but he may recover if his
injury is proximately caused by a hidden or unanticipated risk
attributable to the landowner's negligence. 169
3. Circumstances Implying an Invitation to Enter the Land
of Another
Officer Newton was injured when he responded in perform-
ance of his public duty to a silent burglar alarm on the premises of
defendant. It appears that the court treated this silent "call for
assistance" as an invitation to enter the premises of the defendant
landowner in order to establish a duty of care as a "quasi-invitee".
It is clear from the facts of the case, the analysis by the Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court that Plaintiff was neither a
traditional common law invitee nor a licensee. Justice Frye
stated:
Plaintiff was obliged to enter the premises to discharge his duties
as a public officer. While plaintiff does not fit the traditional defi-
nitions of either licensee or invitee, we believe that he should be
166. Newton, 342 N.C. at 562, 467 S.E.2d at 64. See supra text accompanying
notes 91-100 for a discussion of persons on the land as a matter of right. In other
jurisdictions, police officers entering under authority of law have generally been
found to be licensees, but some courts find them to be invitees or to have special
status.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of
Premises to Police Officer Coming Thereon in Discharge of Officer's Duty, 30
A.L.R.4th 81 n.10 (1990).
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accorded the same protection as one who is invited to the land-
owner's premises.
1 70
It is certain from the Newton decision that a police officer
responding to a silent alarm in North Carolina is afforded the duty
of care due to an invitee. It is not certain under what circum-
stances this status will be extended?
A broad interpretation of Newton would extend this "quasi
invitee" duty of care to all circumstances in which a police officer
enters the land of another by authority of law. Possibilities
include routine security patrols, service of process, pursuing an
alleged burglar across the premises, conducting surveillance of
potentially criminal behavior, responding to an altercation
between rowdy citizens at a public facility, or a noisy domestic dis-
pute reported by an annoyed neighbor. In some of these examples,
there is no direct benefit to the landowner, and hence no explicit
reason to infer an invitation. This absence of benefit to the land-
owner suggests an unfairness in assigning a landowner liability
for injuries to an individual he did not invite onto his land.
A morie narrow interpretation would limit this "quasi-invitee"
status to situations where an invitation can realistically be
implied. Examples may include stepped up security patrols in
response to a business owner's request after a break-in or vandal-
ism, a telephone call to 911 for help during a domestic conflict or
suspected burglary attempt, investigation by police officers of a
crime reported by the landowner on his property, or presentations
by police officers in schools, churches, or at other civic meetings.
In these instances, the landowner requests the presence of a police
officer and implicitly committs to liability for injuries caused by
negligent maintenance of the premises.
4. The Landowner's Duty to Warn of Hidden Perils or Unsafe
Conditions
When a landowner purposefully invites a person onto his
premises for the purpose of transacting business, he has both the
obligation to use ordinary care to keep his property reasonably
safe and the obligation to warn of dangers on the premises. In
North Carolina, when a police officer enters another's property
under authority of law, the officer is impliedly owed the same duty
of care as an ordinary invitee. Apparently, invitation or consent to
a police officer's presence upon the land is irrelevant in establish-
170. Newton, 342 N.C. at 562, 467 S.E.2d 64.
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ing the landowner's liability for injuries sustained by the officer.
The landowner has a duty to warn invitees of hidden perils or
unsafe conditions. However, the Newton decision did not indicate
how a landowner can be expected to convey such a warning if he
does not know and has no reason to know the police officer is on
his property.
The role of a police officer is unique.171 He enters the land of
others routinely in the performance of his public duties, often
without the landowner even being aware that he has entered the
premises. Perhaps the duties owed to a police officer by landown-
ers should be unique as well. 172 One court imposes liability on a
possessor of land for physical harm to a police officer which is
caused by a condition of the land only if the possessor:
(1) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to such invitee, and
(2) should expect that the invitee will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect himself against it, and
(3) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against
the danger.' 73
The third requirement implies that the landowner must know
about the police officer's presence in order to be held liable for
injury to the police officer. Another court spelled it out clearly
when it established that the duty of care owed by a landowner or
occupier of land to a police officer who enters the land under
authority of law, regardless of whether he was summoned by the
owner or entered of his own volition, was:
(1) to use reasonable care to keep in safe condition those parts of
the premises which are used as the ordinary means of access for
all persons entering thereon, and
(2) IF HE KNEW OF THE OFFICER'S PRESENCE ON THE PREMISES, was
cognizant of a dangerous condition thereon, and had reason to
believe that the officer was unaware of the danger, To WARN mwI
OF THE CONDITION AND OF THE RISK.
1 7 4
A reasonable alternative to the invitee duty of care may
require a landowner to warn a police officer of hidden perils where
171. Tinney, supra note 169, § 4(c).
172. Id.
173. Tinney, supra note 169, § 4(b) (discussing Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods,Inc., 328
N.E. 2d 538 (IM1. 1975)).
174. Tinney, supra note 169, § 3(d) (citing Bartholomew v. Klingter County,
126 Cl. Rpt. 191 (Cal. 1975)) (emphasis added).
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the landowner has knowledge of the peril, but only when the land-
owner has the opportunity to give warning. 175 The "proper test to
be applied to the liability of the landowner [is] that of 'reasonable-
ness' which should be resolved by the trier of fact." 76
V. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Newton v.
New Hanover County Board of Education establishes North Caro-
lina as one of the minority jurisdictions that recognize police
officers sui generis when they enter the land of another under
authority of law. 177 Rather than applying the traditional common
law categories of "invitee," "licensee," and "trespasser" to police
officers, our Supreme Court has carved an exception to landowner
liability when a police officer is injured on the premises as a result
of the landowner's negligence. In so doing, police officers are now
entitled to sue negligent landowners for injuries that occur when
they enter upon the land by authority of law. It is unknown at
this time whether the holding will be limited to instances when an
invitation to a police officer to enter can be realistically implied
(i.e. entry in response to the landowner's silent alarm), or whether
the holding will apply to all circumstances when a police officer
enters the land of another by authority of law, even when there is
no direct benefit to the landowner.
While the rights of police officers are expanded by this deci-
sion, the responsibility of landowners for injury to police officers is
expanded as well. In North Carolina, the common law regarding
invitees requires a landowner to use ordinary care to keep his
property reasonably safe and to warn of hidden perils or unsafe
conditions that could be ascertained by reasonable inspection. It
is untenable that a landowner should be under a similar duty to
warn an entrant to land of hidden perils or unsafe conditions if the
land owner is unaware that the entrant is upon his land. The
duty to warn should be imposed only where there is reasonable
opportunity to warn, a circumstance that is possible only when the
landowner is aware that a police officer is on his premises or is
about to enter his premises.
By eliminating the need for a police officer to be classified as
invitee or licensee in order to recover for injuries due to landowner
175. Tinney, supra note 169, § 4(c).
176. Tinney, supra note 169, § 9(a).
177. Newton, 342 N.C. 554, 467 S.E.2d 58.
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negligence, and treating this class sui generis, the Court may have
opened the door to future consideration of eliminating these clas-
sifications for other groups who enter the land in the performance
of a public duty, e.g. firefighters. Perhaps the Court or the legisla-
ture will consider the complete elimination of the common law
classifications of "invitee," licensee," and "trespasser" and thereby
join a growing minority of jurisdictions that recognize that the
foundation of determining whether a landowner is liable for the
injuries to an entrant on his property is the standard of reason-
able care and foreseeability.
Linda Sayed
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